

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 03421

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY MEETING, MAR 3, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO. 160

1. SUMMARY. IN FORMAL STATEMENT, MOROKHOV (USSR) CRITICIZED SEVERAL ASPECTS OF US PROPOSAL FOR INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS (ISIS) AND EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT US HAD SHIFTED ITS THINKING SO THAT ISIS WERE THE MAIN VERIFICATION MEANS RATHER THAN MERELY AN ADDITIONAL SYSTEM TO SUPPLEMENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SPECIFIC US PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, HE REAFFIRMED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER EQUIPMENT MEETING AGREED TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, TOGETHER WITH AGREED AUTHENTICATION DEVICES, IN STATIONS SOVIETS DESIGNATED FOR GLOBAL NETWORK AND TO INSTALL THE DEVICES PURSUANT TO AGREED PROCEDURES. HE REAFFIRMED WILLINGNESS TO DESIGNATE ADDITIONAL STATIONS. WARNKE URGED SOVIETS TO APPROACH ISIS COOPERATIVELY AND SAID IT WAS NOT HELPFUL FOR DELEGATIONS TO QUESTION EACH
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OTHER'S MOTIVATIONS. IN HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, MOROKHOV TOOK A NEGATIVE VIEW OF PROPOSED CCD EXPERIMENTAL DATA EXCHANGE EXERCISE. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET REP (MOROKHOV) DELIVERED PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTEL) OUTLINING SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO SEVERAL PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF US PROPOSALS FOR ISIS. IN PREFACE, HE

SAID THAT HE HAD BELIEVED THAT ALL DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, SUPPLEMENTED BY DATA EXCHANGE, WAS TO BE THE PRINCIPAL METHOD OF VERIFICATION AND THAT ISIS WOULD MERELY BE AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE, ONE THAT, FOR THE U.S. WOULD INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF TRUST IN POLITICAL CIRCLES AND THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC. HE STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN PREPARED TO CONSIDER US ISI PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT THOUGHT THAT ISIS COULD DISSIPATE DOUBTS ABOUT AMBIGUOUS EVENTS REGISTERED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND WOULD SIMPLIFY VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, ANALYSIS OF US PAPERS SHOWS THAT THE SYSTEM THE US IS PROPOSING WOULD BE THE MAIN VERIFICATION MEANS RATHER THAN AN ADDITIONAL ONE.

3. SPECIFICALLY HE CRITICIZED THE US PROPOSAL ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: (1) IT ENVISAGES A SYSTEM UNDER WHICH ONE STATE WOULD EXERCISE REMOTE CONTROL OF INSTRUMENTATION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE, AND IN THIS SENSE ISIS WERE LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM "BLACK BOXES"; (2) THE SITE SELECTION PROCEDURES WOULD PERMIT ONE STATE'S SPECIALISTS TO TRAVEL WIDELY IN ANOTHER STATE WITH VARIOUS KINDS OF EQUIPMENT. THIS RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT US MOTIVES AND WAS AN UNNECESSARY PROCEDURE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ANNOUNCED ITS READINESS TO DESIGNATE A NUMBER OF STATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK AND HAS SAID IT COULD DEDICATE AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF STATIONS; (3) THE US PROPOSALS FOR PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES IN TESTING (PRESUMABLY CHECKOUT) AND MAINTENANCE AMOUNTED TO DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN OTHER NATIONS' INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING AT ANY TIME FOR PURPOSES THAT ARE NOT CLEAR; (4) IF ALL PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS DISCUSS THEIR TECHNICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT LENGTH, AS US HAD, THIS WOULD DEFER THE TASK OF ELABORATING TREATY TEXT. TO GET ON WITH OUR PRACTICAL TASK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HAVE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE TREATY REGIME, WE MUST RELY ON WHAT ALREADY EXISTS; (5) INSTRUMENTS PROPOSED BY THE US WERE CLEARLY EXCESSIVE BECAUSE THEY COULD REGISTER ANY EVENTS TAKING PLACE ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE, INCLUDING EVENTS HAVING NO RELATION TO THIS TREATY. ISIS SHOULD RECEIVE ADDITIONAL DATA ONLY IN ORDER TO REDUCE AMBIGUITY OF EVENTS DETECTED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; (6) USE OF SATELLITES FOR COMMUNICATIONS PURPOSES IS CONNECTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. DATA TRANSMISSION, WITH DUE REGARD FOR AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF RELIABILITY, IS A NATIONAL MATTER FOR A

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PATION IN THE GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK AND HAS SAID IT COULD DEDICATE AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF STATIONS; (3) THE US PROPOSALS FOR PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES IN TESTING (PRESUMABLY CHECKOUT) AND MAINTENANCE AMOUNTED TO DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN OTHER NATIONS' INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING AT ANY TIME FOR PURPOSES THAT ARE NOT CLEAR; (4) IF ALL PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS DISCUSS THEIR TECHNICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT LENGTH, AS US HAD, THIS WOULD DEFER THE TASK OF ELABORATING TREATY TEXT. TO GET ON WITH OUR PRACTICAL TASK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HAVE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE TREATY REGIME, WE MUST RELY ON WHAT ALREADY EXISTS; (5) INSTRUMENTS PROPOSED BY THE US WERE CLEARLY EXCESSIVE BECAUSE THEY COULD REGISTER ANY EVENTS TAKING PLACE ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE, INCLUDING EVENTS HAVING NO RELATION TO THIS TREATY. ISIS SHOULD RECEIVE ADDITIONAL DATA ONLY IN ORDER TO REDUCE AMBIGUITY OF EVENTS DETECTED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS; (6) USE OF SATELLITES FOR COMMUNICATIONS PURPOSES IS CONNECTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. DATA TRANSMISSION, WITH DUE REGARD FOR AGREED REQUIREMENTS OF RELIABILITY, IS A NATIONAL MATTER FOR A

PARTY ON WHOSE TERRITORY A STATION IS LOCATED; (7) US
DEL'S ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT CONTAINS TOO MUCH DETAIL, SUCH AS
BOREHOLE DEPTH AND DIAMETER, HAVING NO BEARING ON THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

4. CONCLUDING HIS CRITIQUE, MOROKHOV SAID US PROPOSALS
WOULD COMPLICATE RATHER THAN SIMPLIFY VERIFICATION AND
WOULD INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY; THEREFORE,
THE SOVIET UNION STATES THAT THE US PROPOSAL FOR AN ISI

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SYSTEM WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

5. NEVERTHELESS, AS A STEP TOWARD ITS NEGOTIATING PARTNER
THE USSR COULD AGREE ON SOME ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION
PROCEDURES, INCLUDING:

(A) ESTABLISHING EQUIPMENT, AT STATIONS DESIGNATED BY
SOVIET UNION FOR THE GLOBAL NETWORK, MEETING AGREED
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, USING AUTHENTICATION DEVICE
AGREED UPON BY THE SIDES;

(B) THE AUTHENTICATION DEVICE WOULD BE INSTALLED AND
MAINTAINED PURSUANT TO AGREED PROCEDURES;

(C) THE EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED SOLELY
AND STRICTLY FOR VERIFICATION OF THE TREATY;

(D) THE SIDES WOULD USE AGREED CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS;

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(E) OPERATION OF THE STATIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED EXCLUSIVELY BY NATIONAL PERSONNEL;

(F) IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIED PROVISIONS WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

6. UK REP (EDMONDS) SUGGESTED THAT MOROKHOV'S STATEMENTS WOULD BENEFIT BY TECHNICAL EXPERTS' DISCUSSION. IN PREPARED STATEMENT, HE SUGGESTED THAT PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL EXERCISE OF SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL AND PROPOSED THAT US, UK AND USSR SUPPORT THAT PROPOSAL. HE ALSO URGED THAT POLITICAL WORKING GROUP DISCUSS COORDINATED APPROACH TO REPORTING TRILATERAL PROGRESS TO THE CCD WHEN THAT BODY BEGINS DISCUSSING CTB ON MARCH 13. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASK IS TO ACHIEVE SOME SORT OF MOVEMENT ON DURATION AND THAT MOVEMENT BY THE USSR ON THIS ISSUE WAS CALLED FOR.

7. WARNKE FOUND SOVIET APPROACH TO ISIS SOMEWHAT CONFRONTATIONAL AND INSUFFICIENTLY COOPERATIVE. IT DOES NOT HELP TO QUESTION US MOTIVES. ISIS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PACKAGE. THEY HAVE POLITICAL VALUE ONLY IF THEY ARE TECHNICALLY EFFECTIVE. THE APPROACH TO VERIFICATION MUST BE IMAGINATIVE, TECHNICALLY ADVANCED, AND COOPERATIVE, AND WE SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID OF EXCELLENCE. ISIS MUST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL DATA. IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO ITS PROPOSAL. THE US HOPES THAT MOROKHOV'S COMMENTS ARE THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE LEADING TO AN AGREED SET OF CHARACTERISTICS FOR ISIS.

8. DURING HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING FOLLOWING PLENARY,
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IN WHICH ISI PROBLEM WAS FURTHER DISCUSSED, WARNKE NOTED THAT UNDER US ISI PROPOSAL NO COMMANDS WOULD BE SENT TO STATIONS EXCEPT FROM THE HOST PARTY. DELEGATION HEADS AGAIN DISCUSSED NATURE OF EVENT THAT COULD LEAD TO OSI REQUESTS BUT CONVERSATION WAS INCONCLUSIVE. MOROKHOV INDICATED THAT SOVIETS WERE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED THAT

UNLESS SEISMIC EVIDENCE WAS REQUIRED FOR OSI REQUESTS UNDER MULTILATERAL TREATY, MANY COUNTRIES MIGHT MAKE HARASSING REQUESTS FOR OSIS. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, MOROKHOV SAID THAT EXPERTS COULD DESIGN AN EXPERIMENTAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE EXERCISE BUT THAT THE EXERCISE SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. MOROKHOV INSISTED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF DATA WAS ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING THE CTB WORK WELL, THAT THEREFORE ONLY PARTIES TO THE TREATY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN IT AND RECEIVE THE DATA THAT WAS GENERATED, AND THAT THE CCD AD HOC EXPERTS HAD NO RIGHT OR POWER WHATEVER TO CONDUCT AN EXERCISE. WARNKE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR POLITICAL ADVISERS TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD BE A REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR THE CCD, ESPECIALLY WITH THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT COMING UP SOON.

9. IN SEPARATE INFORMAL DISCUSSION, SOVIET DELOFF SOFRONOV SAID HE HOPED TO MAKE A MORE SPECIFIC PRESENTATION ON ISIS IN THE NEXT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING "IF I CAN OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF MY COLLEAGUES". IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS HE INDICATED THAT MOROKHOV HAD NOT RULED OUT THE USE OF DIGITIZED DATA, THE KIND OF ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION DEVICE PROPOSED BY THE US, OR THE SEALING OF SUCH DEVICE, BUT HE SAW NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SEALING THE ENTIRE BOREHOLE. HE ALSO REPLIED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT JOINT INSTALLATION. US DELOFFS PRESSED HIM THAT JOINT REPAIR OF AUTHENTICATION EQUIPMENT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE SAME REASONING THAT JUSTIFIED JOINT INSTALLATION. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, SOFRONOV CLAIMED

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THAT HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT UNDER US PROPOSAL A PARTY WOULD BE FAMILIAR, IN ADVANCE, WITH ALL OF THE HARDWARE CONTAINED IN THE STATIONS ON ITS TERRITORY AND WOULD ONLY LACK ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULAR KEY WORDS GENERATED BY THE AUTHENTICATION MODULE. HE SAID THE US DELOFF'S EXPLANATION OF THIS FACT WAS VERY HELPFUL AND COULD SIMPLIFY NEGOTIATIONS, ADDING THAT THE PROBLEMS WITH JOINT REPAIR WERE "JURIDICAL" NOT "TECHNICAL". WARNKE

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